Water Wars - or Water Riots?

Today is 'Blog Action Day 2010', and this year, bloggers around the world are writing about water.  To join in, I've put together a post on how water insecurity had led to conflict around the world.  I've also added their 'widget' to the bottom of the page for this weekend only - why not sign the petition?

Oropoi, Kenya - Photo courtesy IRIN

In the security sector, water security is sexy as an issue because of the perceived threats of interstate conflict over shared water supplies, like rivers or lakes. Journalists love writing stories about 'water wars'.  We've written about this on this blog before, like when we discussed the Strategic Importance of Water between India and China or whether India and Pakistan can share the Indus.  Unfortunately for the hype of the journalists, projects like Aaron Wolf's Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database at the University of Oregon or Peter Gleick's Pacific Institute have shown that shared water supplies have been much more likely to help promote interstate cooperation than to provoke conflict.  In fact, in our work on climate change and security at the IISS we have found widespread agreement among experts that the more pressing threat when we discuss water and conflict is its potential to create or exacerbate local civil and ethnic conflicts.  


When looking at the causes of any conflict analytically, it is difficult to separate the effects of water shortages from other factors, like food shortages, migration, ethnicity, climate change or other issues that could drive violence. However, the impact of water over energy, development, agriculture, and livelihood makes it one of the most important factors. When water insecurity is mixed with urbanization, migration, pollution, radicalization, and a proliferation of small arms, it is not difficult to see a scenario resulting in conflict.


Water shortages or imbalances of water distribution can be driver of civil conflict in a marginalized society. In terms of terminology, ʹwater riotʹ is more appropriate that ʹwater warʹ. Examples of small‐level riots - some leading to deaths - can be shown in Nigeria, South Africa, Yemen, Egypt, India, and Ecuador. These water riots can be expected to show similar characteristics to the food‐related riots that erupted around the world in 2008. Areas of particular risk are those with strong ethnic or tribal divisions, and the effects of water riots may be to drive disaffected and marginalized parts of society away from areas of water stress.

While no one factor (like water, ethnicity, or unemployment) was able to correctly predict when these regions fell into conflict, changes in water security often can be enough to tip a region over the edge.

Chile's Constitution: Water to be a Matter of National Security

A proposal by Chile's outgoing President, Michelle Bachelet would put an amendment to the Chilean Constitution saying that acces to fresh water is a matter of national security.  According to the article "CHILE: Water a Matter of National Security" by Daniela Estrada, from the Inter Press Service:  

The legal text recognises that freshwater, which is lacking in the Chilean north and abundant in the south, has become a "scarce good" and that its availability is "a matter of national security," much more than fossil fuels, which can be imported from other countries.

The proposed amendment would undo a law of 1981 (the Water Code) which effectively privatised Chile's fresh water reserves.  The government's proposal states: "with the implementation of a new Water Code, an imbalance resulted between the common good and the interests of a few individuals, an imbalance that must be corrected."  Therfor, this reform seems to be more about a conflict between public and private use of water.  Apparently, under Chilean constitution, once a good is declared a priority of national security, then the government can break contracts or expropriate private property to more effectively or equitably distribute that good. 

Talking about the economic or social impacts of such a policy are beyond the scope of this blog.  However, it leads to some interesting conceptual possibilities, if climate change alters the Chile's water supplies.  The article states: "Chile is a world leader when it comes to freshwater reserves in the form of glaciers. According to the latest inventory by the government's water agency, there are more than 3,500 glaciers, covering some 20,000 square kilometres." If those glaciers all melt (I won't venture to say a date: that has gotten some in trouble recently), then you could see the government (and military) taking charge of water supplies in order to ration them among competing groups: mining, hydro power, agriculture, sewage, and drinking water would all have claims on scarce resources.  If the government does not fairly apportion rights to water, its fairly easy to see how conflict could develop over these water rights, either against the government or between these stakeholder groups.  Just labeling water as a 'matter of national security' does not make these decisions any easier.

China and the Brahmaputra

As a follow-up to the previous post on the need for cooperation among the nations dependant on the rivers from the Himalayas, I've come across a report, "Dammed Rivers" from The Economist's Asia columnist, Banyan saying that Gezhouba, a Chinese construction company, had begun work on a dam across the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, near the India-China border. When it enters India, this river is known as the Brahmaputra, emptying through Bangladesh into the Bay of Bengal.

Related, there is a story in yesterday's Times of India about Indian concerns over the beginning of a plan to divert water from the Yangtze River at the border of the Hubei and Henan provinces in Central China. The Yangtze is a river entirely within the borders of China, so at first glance it would appear that India should not be worried. However, an elaborate network of canals, resevoirs, and dams could concievably connect the rivers to the Yarlunch Tsangpo before it crosses into India. This would divert India and Bangladesh's water north to China.

Earlier this year, I had asked a geologist who specializes on the glaciers of Himilayas whether China could dam or divert the headwaters of any of their major rivers that begin in Tibet, like the Brahmaputra, the Ganges, or the Mekong. He said that such an engineering project would be impossible, because the area is so geologically active and the threat of earthquakes is too great. However, the Chinese are faced with a long-term, dire drought in the North, and they may think that massive engineering projects could get them out of that.

Certainly, diverting the flow of the Yarlung Tsangpo would provoke anger downstream in both India and Bangladesh. The question remains, though, to what extent would they go to stop it? Could conflict ensue over dwindling water resources?

Korea: was the water weapon used?

This weekend, 6 South Koreans were killed by a flash flood. However, unlike usual flash floods (like this tragic flood in Istanbul), this one was not caused by heavy rains. Instead, it appears that the North Korean government opened the gates of its Hwanggang dam, which was just completed in 2007. Because it is only 5 km away from the DMZ, there is a good chance that this dam was built solely for the reason of threatening South Korea with just such an event.

Apparently, North Korea explained the event as a necessary discharge because of high water levels. Unification Minister Hyun In-taek sayis that this was not credible because rainfall the week before in that region was below 0.2 mm. He said that rainfall was not enough to motivate the North to release the water.The South has demanded that the North apologize. f

Korea is not usually an area that is mentioned when talking about the security effects of climate change. However, this event shows how water can be used as a weapon. If climate change causes either extreme drought or extreme rains (both likely events, but in different areas), it is not improbable to believe that water could be used as a real weapon.

(thanks to FP's Passport for the story)

Scientific Specifity Needed

According to the today's NYT, the IPCC's next report may be very helpful for policymakers:

"More attention will be devoted to research on the potential for dangerous changes in ocean chemistry as seas absorb billions of tons of carbon dioxide. Another focus will be large-scale artificial methods of countering warming, called geo-engineering.

The panel will also try harder to identify anticipated impacts of climate change on certain regions, and options for fostering resilience in especially vulnerable places like sub-Saharan Africa."

While the IPCC cannot make policy recommendations, outlining the impacts of specific policy options, such as geo-engineering, and providing more detailed climate scenarios would help policy making and persuade the public on the urgency of climate change. Until then, there is only anecdotal evidence of persistent water shortages near Beijing, in Somalialand, in the West Bank, and in Mumbai. Having causal evidence of climate change on specific regions would aid security and development policy.

The Strategic Importance of Water: India-China

India and China have begun discussions to jointly monitor the Himalayan glaciers that supply water to both the Ganges, Indus and Yangtze rivers. This is a promising sign of cooperation and mutual recognition of the importance of water in a region of the world with heightened risk of climate induced conflict. This will be one of the topics bound to come up at the conference in Nepal in a mouth on climate change. On August 28 China and India are both emerging powers who have fought over border disputes, and China, a key ally of Pakistan, supplies Pakistan with advanced military equipment and weaponry.

The terms of proposed cooperation between the two countries extend only to scientific monitoring of glacial melting in the Himalayas. Hopefully, this can broaden into a more comprehensive dialogue between the two countries over water management instead of mere monitoring because many of India's major rivers originate from the Tibetan plateau controlled by China. Brahma Chellaney, one of India's leading strategic thinkers on arms control and climate security, believes:

...China is now pursuing major inter-basin and inter-river water transfer projects on the Tibetan plateau, which threatens to diminish international-river flows into India and other co-riparian states. Before such hydro-engineering projects sow the seeds of water conflict, China ought to build institutionalized, cooperative river-basin arrangements with downstream states.

India's government recognizes its strategic situation and Indian minister Jairam Ramesh's recent trip to Beijing reflects that. Ramesh called China a "countervailing power" in efforts to resist pressure from Western nations for hard emission caps in this December's Copenhagen negotiations. Ramesh also said "India considers China to be its most important ally in the Copenhagen negotiation process." By stressing commonalities between India and China have on climate and trade, India can begin to engage China on a broader set of environmental issues, such as water management because climate change could lead to drought in India.

India and China face enormous population pressures and the demand for water in both countries will grow for the foreseeable future as each develops especially since India's population growth rate is higher than China's. Climate change is altering the balance of power between the two countries by increasing the importance of water, a variable that China controls.

Pre-empting climate conflicts

One of the most often cited areas where climate induced conflict could occur is the Pakistan/India border where the Himalayan glaciers are melting. At today's Senate Commitee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn, outlined Egypt as a new scenario where climate change and conflict intersect. Today, talks on creating a framework to govern water sharing on the Nile River collapsed. The UPI directly links the strategic situation of the Nile to climate change stating:

Climate change in recent years has reduced rainfall, leading to lower water flows in the Nile and jeopardizing hydraulic projects in several states.

Egypt and neighboring Sudan are the Nile's largest consumers. Egypt, which lies at the end of the river as it flows into the Mediterranean, does not contribute any water to the Nile system.

But it has the largest population -- 80.24 million -- and the greatest military power among the riparian states and thus the highest demand for water. For Cairo, safeguarding the Nile water is a strategic objective.

While India and Pakistan at least have the Indus Water Treaty that's survived multiple wars, the collapse in talks over any legal agreement among all ten countries in the Nile basin underscores how difficult water negotiating agreements already are. Climate change will make it even more difficult to negotiate water treaties that prevent conflict when river flow decreases.